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Generalized contextuality refers to our inability of explaining measurement statistics using a context-
independent probabilistic and ontological model. On the other hand, measurement statistics can also be modeled
using the framework of general probabilistic theories (GPTs). Here, starting from a construction of GPTs based
on a Gleason-type theorem, we fully characterize these structures with respect to their permission and rejection
of generalized (non)contextual ontological models. It follows that in any GPT construction the three insistence
of (i) the no-restriction hypothesis, (ii) the ontological noncontextuality, and (iii) multiple nonrefinable mea-
surements for any fixed number of outcomes are incompatible. Hence, any GPT satisfying the no-restriction
hypothesis is ontologically noncontextual if and only if it is simplicial. We give a detailed discussion of GPTs
for which the no-restriction hypothesis is violated, and show that they can always be considered as subtheories
(subGPTs) of GPTs satisfying the hypothesis. It is shown that subGPTs are ontologically noncontextual if and
only if they are subtheories of simplicial GPTs of the same dimensionality. Finally, we establish as a corollary
the necessary and sufficient condition for a single resourceful measurement or state to promote an ontologically
noncontextual (i.e. classical) general probabilistic theory to an ontologically contextual (i.e. nonclassical) one
under the no-restriction hypothesis.
I. INTRODUCTION
A promise of classical theories is to give a probabilistic
account for the statistics resulted from prepare-and-measure
experiments on single physical systems without relying upon
their particular operational procedure, or context. Contextu-
ality [1–4], and more recently, generalized contextuality [5],
refer to no-go theorems dismissing context-independent clas-
sical models for measured statistics. Hence, a plausible defini-
tion of nonclassicality of statistics is through their generalized
contextuality [6, 7].
Besides probabilistic (or ontological) models, statistics
from operational procedures can also be modeled using the
framework of general probabilistic theories (GPTs), an ex-
ample of which is quantum theory [8–14]. Nonclassical data
thus mean that none of their potential GPT explanations can
be translated into a noncontextual ontological model [5]. Re-
cently, Kunjwal and Spekkens [15] and Schmid et al [16] pro-
vided noncontextuality inequalities for detection of possible
nonclassical statistics. In this Letter, we determine which
GPTs for physical phenomena allow and which ones disal-
low noncontextual ontological models. More specifically, we
prove a Gleason-type theorem for construction of GPTs and
show that, in finite dimensions, any GPT that satisfies the no-
restriction hypothesis [10] must possess simplex sets of non-
refinable effects and states to be ontologically noncontextual.
We then discuss the scenario in which the no-restriction hy-
pothesis is removed.
The practical significance of our analysis lies within a
markedly interesting context. Referring to the scenario of
quantum computations with Clifford circuits, stabilizer input
states, and Pauli measurements, it is well-known that such
computations authorize a classical model making them clas-
sically efficiently simulatable [17–20]. This possibility is re-
moved by providing only a single suitable nonstabilizer input
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state (or measurement) that “magically” enables fault-tolerant
universal quantum computing [20–24]. Thus, there are scenar-
ios in which only a single extra preparation or measurement
procedure is resourceful in that it simultaneously gives rise to
two phenomena. First, it generates data that render a classical
model impossible. Second, it causes a significant improve-
ment in the performance of some information processing pro-
tocols. Our analysis here is motivated by the first phenomenon
which is a prerequisite of the second.
The study of resources for information processing purposes
commonly begins with assuming an underlying theory. Think-
ing of quantum theory, this is beautifully done within the for-
malism of quantum resource theories [25] such as entangle-
ment [26], athermality [27–32], coherence [33–36], asymme-
try [37–39], non-Markovianity [40], and dynamical correla-
tions [41]. Here, we instead relax the assumption of a specific
underlying theory by adopting the generic formalism of GPTs
and use our first result to obtain the necessary and sufficient
criterion to distinguish between classicality and nonclassical-
ity of a single resourceful measurement or state leading to po-
tential nonclassical information processing advantages [7].
II. ONTOLOGICAL MODELS
Throughout this paper, we are only interested in the
prepare-and-measure experiments on single systems that can
be described in finite dimensions. Operationally, the primitive
elements of our physical description in any such experiment
are the laboratory prescriptions for preparations and measure-
ments forming the collectionsP:={Pk} andM :={Mj}, re-
spectively [5]. The fundamental goal in theoretical physics is
to establish assignments between these elements and mathe-
matical objects endowed with a set of rules to determine the
outcome probabilities in each measurement. A first generic
step is to meaningfully assign (not necessarily scalar) “sizes”,
called measures, to measurement outcomes. Given the finite
set Ω of all outcomes, a set ω of its subsets on which such as-
signments are well-defined is called the σ-algebra of events
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2and the pair (Ω,ω) is named a measurable space; see Ap-
pendix A for a brief review.
Ontological models go beyond the minimal promise of the-
oretical physics by assuming an underlying ontic variable
space Υ and assigning physical phenomena to elements of re-
ality. In this process, the operational elements, i.e. prepara-
tions and measurements, correspond most generally to prob-
abilistic preparations and measurements of the ontic variable
and thus, they are represented by probability distributions and
indicator functions over Υ, respectively. More precisely, one
defines also a σ-algebra υ on Υ and designates “sizes” to
members of both ω and υ that are probabilities, aka probabil-
ity measures. Given the collections Y and Q of all probabil-
ity measures on (Υ,υ) and (Ω,ω), respectively, the ontological
model then hypothesizes the existence of convex linear maps
µ:P→Y and ξ:M→Q that assign the ontic state µP to the
preparation procedure P and the ontic measurement ξM to the
measurement procedure M [5]. Thus, for each preparation,
µP : υ → [0, 1] and
∫
Υ
dλµP(λ) = 1, (1)
and for each measurement,
ξM : ω×Υ→ [0,1] and ξM(Ω|λ) = 1 ∀λ ∈ Υ. (2)
Then, the probability of a particular eventX in a measurement
M given the preparation P can be obtained via Bayes’ rule,
p(X|P,M)=
∫
Υ
dλµP(λ)ξM(X|λ). (3)
III. GENERAL PROBABILISTIC THEORIES
A second approach to the abstraction of operational scenar-
ios is known as general probabilistic theories (GPTs). Their
constructions begin with assuming a vector space V whose
elements can (at least partially) be ordered and on which an
inner-product 〈·,·〉 can be defined [8–14]. In the example of
quantum theory, this vector space is the Banach spaceL (H)
of all bounded linear Hermitian operators on a Hilbert space
H with the usual Hilbert-Schmidt inner product. In con-
trast to ontological models, in this case, to each measurement
event X∈ω we assign a vector as its “size”; cf. Appendix A.
Hence, instead of a probability measure we have a proba-
bility vector-valued measure (PVVM) which is a function
E:ω→V satisfying (i) E(X)>0 for all X∈ω, (ii) E(Ω)=U
for a fixed nonzero element U∈V called the unit element, and
(iii) E(∪iXi)=
∑
iE(Xi) for all sequences of disjoint events
Xi∈ω. An easy way to make sense of these conditions is by
comparing a PVVM to a probability measure where after the
substitutions V 7→R and U 7→1 the former simply reduces to
the latter; see Appendix A. Each vector E(Xi) is called an
effect where their collection is denoted by E . The familiar
quantum counterpart of a PVVM is a positive operator-valued
measure (POVM) [42, 43].
Suppose that along with a measurement havingE(X) as an
effect the experimenter tosses a (biased) coin with probability
p for heads and accepts the occurrences of X only if the coin
is heads. Assuming that the product rule of probability holds,
the effect corresponding to the accepted events is given by
pE(X). Hence, it is reasonable to assume that given any op-
erationally legitimate effect E(X), the effect pE(X) for any
real number p∈[0, 1] is also allowed. Further, suppose that E1
and E2 are two PVVMs and our experimenter performs E1 if
the coin is heads and E2 otherwise. The resulting PVVM is
thus Ep:=pE1+(1−p)E2 implying that the set of all effects
E is convex. In order that the latter to be a well-defined sum-
mation E1 and E2 have to possess a common domain. Conse-
quently, throughout this paper we assume that the event space
ω is fixed. Finally, we assume that E spans V . These allow
us to state a Gleason-type theorem for GPTs as follows.
Theorem 1. Any generalized probability measure q:E→[0, 1]
satisfying (i) q(E(X))>0 for all effects E(X)∈E , (ii)
q(U)=1, and (iii) q(
∑
iE(Xi))=
∑
iq(E(Xi)) for all se-
quences of effects in E that satisfy
∑
iE(Xi)6U , must be of
the form q(A)=〈A,B〉 for allA∈V , for a uniqueB∈V which
is normalized in the sense that 〈U,B〉=1.
As presented in Appendix B, Theorem 1 is simply proven
by extending probability measures on E to the whole V and
using Riesz’s representation theorem.
Given effect space E , the state space of the GPT can
be delineated using Theorem 1 in conjunction with the no-
restriction hypothesis [10], i.e. that given PVVM space E all
definable probability measures (q’s) on it correspond to phys-
ically valid states, as
S := {% ∈ V |〈E(X),%〉 > 0 ∀E(X) ∈ E ,〈U,%〉 = 1}. (4)
We denote a GPT by its pair of PVVM and state space as
T :=(E ,S ).
Here, instead of a priori assuming the probability rule of
GPTs, we have derived it from a set of reasonable assump-
tions following in footsteps of Gleason [44], Busch [45], and
Caves et al [46]. Moreover, it is argued, for example in
Refs. [11, 47, 48], that the no-restriction hypothesis is of no
physical basis and thus, it is desirable to drop it from GPT
constructions. We note that, such a “relaxation” comes at a
price: one has to assume a priori also the state assignments,
meaning trading one assumption for another. Indeed, there
is no objection to not imposing the no-restriction hypothesis,
however, we have shown in Appendix C that any GPT that
does not satisfy the no-restriction hypothesis is obtained as a
subtheory of possibly (infinitely) many GPTs that do satisfy
it by imposing appropriate further constraints, thus named a
subGPT. To give an example, consider quantum mechanics as
a specific GPT that satisfies the no-restriction hypothesis and
from which the subGPT of Gaussian quantum mechanics is
obtained by restricting the effect and state spaces to those ele-
ments possessing Gaussian Wigner representations [49]. No-
tably, quantum theory is not the unique GPT containing Gaus-
sian quantum mechanics, for it is also a subtheory of classical
statistical (or Liouville) mechanics [49].
Within the rest of this paper, we use GPT and subGTP to
distinguish between theories that do and do not comply with
the no-restriction hypothesis, respectively.
3FIG. 1. The diagrammatic representation of different model con-
structions for operational descriptions of experiments. The dotted ar-
row represents the detour approach for building NCOMs for GPTs.
A GPT that admits an NCOM is called ontologically noncontextual.
IV. BROAD (NON)CONTEXTUALITY
Irrespective of which approach is adopted to explain ex-
perimental data, be it an ontological model or a (sub)GPT,
broad noncontextuality (as defined below) is a desirable hy-
pothesis about the description. Beginning with the statistical
equivalence assumption [5, 42], two preparations P1,P2∈P
are statistically indiscernible and equivalent, P1∼=P2, if and
only if for every measurement procedure M∈M and every
event X∈ω it holds that p(X|P1,M)=p(X|P2,M). Similarly,
two measurements M1,M2∈M are statistically indiscernible
and equivalent, M1∼=M2, if and only if for every prepara-
tion procedure P∈P and every event X∈ω it holds that
p(X|P,M1)=p(X|P,M2). These relations partition the col-
lections of preparations and measurements into equivalence
classes e(P) and e(M) for each preparation P and measure-
ment M. The particular way in which a state or measurement
is experimentally realized corresponds to an element within
an equivalence class and it is called a context. The broad
noncontextuality hypothesis states that our models of physical
phenomena aiming only at reproducing the statistics should
depend only on equivalence classes rather than individual con-
texts, because statistics do not carry any information about the
latter; see e.g. Ref. [46].
An ontological model which is noncontextual in the broad
sense is called a noncontextual ontological model (NCOM)
and satisfies
P1 ∼= P2 ⇔ µP1 = µP2 ,
M1 ∼= M2 ⇔ {ξM1(X|λ)} = {ξM2(X|λ)}.
(5)
Similarly, broad noncontextulaity of (sub)GPTs reads as
P1 ∼= P2 ⇔ P1,P2 7→ %,
M1 ∼= M2 ⇔ M1,M2 7→ {E(X)}. (6)
Note that, broad noncontextuality is built-in to our GPT and
subGPT constructions. In general, however, it is possible to
construct (sub)GPTs that do not respect the broad noncon-
textuality hypothesis by allowing for context-dependent effect
and state assignments. Importantly, it follows from our con-
structions here that every NCOM is a (sub)GPT while the con-
verse is not true. In this Letter, our aim is to determine which
(sub)GPTs do and which ones do not admit an NCOM; see
Fig 1.
V. ONTOLOGICAL (NON)CONTEXTUALITY OF
(SUB)GPTS
As we have inferred from experiments in the quantum
regime, that to take a direct route and build an NCOM to de-
scribe all possible physical experiments seems very unlikely.
Yet we may ask if it is possible to take a detour, as shown in
Fig 1, and construct ontological models of (sub)GPTs, not-
ing that, with appropriate care, such models will inherit the
noncontextuality from the theory leading to NCOMs. For
quantum theory as a GPT the answer to our question is in
negative [6, 50]. In case of a generic (sub)GPT, we re-
place the preparation and measurement procedures P and M
in Eqs. (1), (2), and (3), with their representatives in the the-
ory, %∈S and {E(X)}⊂E , respectively. Hence, there should
exist injective maps η:S→Y and ζ:E→Q that assign the
unique ontic state η% and ontic measurement ζE to each state
vector % and PVVME, respectively, such that for all λ∈Υ and
all events X∈ω,
η%(λ) > 0, ζE(X|λ) ∈ [0,1], (7)
and satisfy∫
Υ
dλη%(λ) = 1, and ∀λ ζE(Ω|λ) = 1. (8)
The probability of a particular event X in a measurement M
given the preparation P should then be obtained as
p(X|P,M)=p(X|%,E)=
∫
Υ
dλη%(λ)ζE(X|λ). (9)
Within recent literature a noncontextual (sub)theory usually
refers to a (sub)theory that admits an NCOM [5]. For clarity,
here we call such a (sub)theory ontologically noncontextual
and reserve the term noncontextuality for the broader notion.
We note also that any ontologically noncontextual (sub)theory
is noncontextual while the converse is not true. For instance,
quantum theory satisfies broad noncontextuality hypothesis
but, it is not ontologically noncontextual as it contains effects
and states that do not possess a unique convex decomposition
in terms of the respective extremal elements [6, 50]. The latter
is clarified by the following analysis.
A. GPTs
We now analyze ontological noncontextuality of GPTs. Re-
call that the maps µ and ξ, and hence η and ζ, are con-
vex linear. Using the fact that S and E both span V ,
η and ζ can uniquely be extended to the whole space V .
Then, using Riesz’s theorem we find that they must be of
the forms η%(λ)=〈%,F (λ)〉 and ζE(X|λ)=〈E(X),D(λ)〉
for F (λ), D(λ)∈V . Satisfying Eq. (8) then requires that∫
Υ
dλF (λ)=U and 〈U,D(λ)〉=1 for all λ ∈ Υ. Thus,
F :={F (λ)} resembles a PVVM whereas D :={D(λ)} is a
subset of GPT’s state space. The probability rule of Eq. (9)
4then implies thatF and D are dual frames [50, 51] for repre-
sentation of vectors in V so that
%=
∫
Υ
dλη%(λ)D(λ), and E(X)=
∫
Υ
dλF (λ)ζE(X|λ). (10)
After taking into account that state vectors are dual to mea-
surement vectors and a few more simple steps (see Ap-
pendix E) we find that F and D must be generating sets of
closed convex sets E and S , respectively, i.e., E=convF
and S=convD . In light of Eq. (10), we conclude from the
latter that the extremal or pure states %∈D and the extremal
or sharp effects E(X)∈F , i.e. states and effects that can-
not convexly be decomposed into other states and effects,
must be represented by Dirac delta measures over the on-
tic space Υ, that is, (i) D3% η7−→δλ%(λ) for some λ%∈Υ and
(ii) F3E(X) ζ7−→δλE(X)(λ) for some λE(X)∈Υ, where δa(β)
equals 0 if a/∈β and equals 1 if a∈β for any measurable subset
β.
The condition (i) is referred to as ontic determinism, which
means a pure preparation [10] represented by a pure state
determines the ontic value λ completely. Accordingly, we
call condition (ii) outcome determinability, that is, in sharp
measurements [52] represented by sharp effects of the theory,
specifying the ontic variable determines the outcome of the
measurement with certainty. Ontic determinism and outcome
determinability enforce that in any ontologically noncontex-
tual GPT state and effect vectors possess unique decomposi-
tions into nonrefinable extremal elements. Specifically, it is
clear from Eq. (10) that requiring a unique ontic representa-
tion η%(λ) for a state vector % simply means a unique convex
decomposition into pure states. Considering sharp effects that
cannot be refined (or atomic effects [10]) and denoting their
collection by Enr⊂F , it follows also that the convex decom-
position of any effect into elements of Enr must be unique.
The following theorem characterizes GPTs for which these
criteria are met and thus, they are ontologically noncontex-
tual. For a detailed proof, please see Appendix E.
Theorem 2. A GPT is ontologically noncontextual if and only
if its pure states and nonrefinable sharp effects each form a
complete basis for the space V . Equivalently, the GPT must
be simplicial meaning thatS and convEnr are simplexes.
B. SubGPTs
As we discussed earlier, subGPT are GPTs with extra re-
strictions on their effect and state spaces. We now determine
the condition for a subGPT to admit an NCOM.
Theorem 3. Any subGPT Tsub=(Esub,Ssub) over Vsub ad-
mits an NCOM if and only if it can be thought of as a subthe-
ory of an ontologically noncontextual GPT T =(E ,S ) over
V and dimVsub= dimV = card Υ.
The proof of Theorem 3 as detailed in Appendix F, simi-
lar to that of Theorem 2, uses the extensions of maps η and
ζ to the whole Vsub which partially explains the condition
dimVsub= dimV . Further clarification is also provided via
two examples in Appendix G. On one hand, we have shown
that Spekkens’ toy model [53] is a 4-dimensional subGPT ad-
mitting an NCOM in four dimensions hence considered to be
a classical subGPT; cf. Appendix G 1. On the other hand,
the stabilizer rebit theory is shown to be a 3-dimensional
subGPT the smallest ontological model admitted by which
is 4-dimensional and thus, ontologically contextual; cf. Ap-
pendix G 2.
From our discussion, it follows that the stabilizer rebit
subGPT cannot be regarded classical despite that it is clas-
sically simulatable in 4-dimensions. The caveat of the 4-
dimensional ontological model is that the excess dimension
gives room for multiple ontic states that are statistically in-
discernible under the subGPT’s measurements, hence violat-
ing the broad noncontextuality hypothesis of Eq. (5), specif-
ically, P1∼=P2;µP1=µP2 ; see Appendix G 2. Intuitively,
this is the case whenever dimV >dimVsub. Classicality of
(sub)GPTs thus requires both their classical simulatability and
that there are no in-principle inaccessible parameters at the
ontological level, i.e. the (sub)GPT is ontologically com-
plete. The latter is in accordance with Leibniz’s methodolog-
ical principle of the ontological identity of empirical indis-
cernibles [54, 55]. We emphasize that this constraint does
not conflict with NCOM approaches to experimental data pre-
sented e.g. in Refs. [7] and [16]; see Appendix H for a further
discussion.
VI. RESOURCES AND CONTEXTUALITY IN GPTS
We now consider the concept of resources at a fundamental
level. Imagine experiments with sets of preparations P and
measurements M , and an experimenter who has devised a
GPT T =(E ,S ) capable of explaining the statistics obtained
in her experiments. We call the set of all possible measure-
ments E free measurements and the set of all possible prepa-
rations S free states. We remark that in quantum resource
theories [25–41] free states and measurements are subsets of
all possible states and measurements. Here, in contrast, all
possible preparations and measurements are defined to be free
and non-free (or resourceful) ones are those yet to be discov-
ered and thus not specified in the GPT.
Now, suppose that the experimenter discovers another
preparation or measurement procedure that was not previ-
ously known to exist. Naturally, she has to come up with a
new theory T ?:=(E ?,S ?) to reproduce also the new mea-
surement data. We ask how T ? compares to T in terms of
(non)classicality. We only consider the case wherein the ex-
tended theory T ? is required to satisfy the no-restriction hy-
pothesis. Then, by Theorem 2, given the new sets of mea-
surements and preparations, M ? and P?, if the nonrefin-
able sharp measurements of the new GPT form a complete
set of PVVMs over a vector space V ?, then the GPT will be
ontologically noncontextual. In such scenarios, even though
the newly discovered element is a resource, all the measured
statistics can be explained in classical terms. Hence, we call
such a bonus procedure a classical resource. On the other
5hand, a resourceful element may enforce a nonclassical exten-
sion of the older theory, where it is called a nonclassical re-
source. The conditions for a single resource to dictate the use
of a nonclassical model for an explanation of possible statis-
tics is provided below and proved in Appendix I.
Theorem 4. Suppose that the set of free measurements M
and preparationsP are represented by PVVMs E and states
S in some classical GPT T =(E ,S ). Given a single nonre-
finable bonus measurement M? (preparation P?), the follow-
ings are equivalent: (i) T ? is ontologically contextual; (ii)
M? (P?) is a nonclassical resourceful measurement (prepa-
ration); (iii) The PVVM E? (state %?) nonconvexly overcom-
pletes the nonrefinable effects Enr (states S ) into E ?nr (S
?);
(iv) E? (%?) lies within V ?=V but E? /∈E (%? /∈S ).
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We considered the phenomenon of generalized contextual-
ity in general probabilistic theories (GPTs) and showed that
any GPT satisfying the no-restriction hypothesis is ontolog-
ically noncontextual if and only if it is simplicial. We also
discussed extensively the case of subGPTs that do not comply
with the norestriction hypothesis. Our results shows that any
GPT can at most subsume two of the three properties of sat-
isfying the no-restriction hypothesis, ontological noncontex-
uality, and possessing multiple nonrefinable measurements.
Some examples to each possibility already exist, e.g. drop-
ping the no-restriction hypothesis that results in subGPTs as
Gaussian quantum mechanics [49], giving up on the ontologi-
cal noncontextuality as in full quantum theory, or capitulating
incompatibility of measurements as in classical mechanics.
A secondary aspect of our work is to provide a new route
towards the characterization of the nonclassical power of indi-
vidual operational elements in information processing proto-
cols by noting that many nonclassical advantages, though de-
scribable by quantum formalism, do not depend on the specif-
ically assumed underlying theory. As an example, in quantum
computations we can draw conclusions about their nonclas-
sicality (similarly to the Bell scenario) by merely relying on
the classical inputs and outputs and the hardness promises of
the computational complexity theory. We thus arrive at two
conclusions. First, a nonclassical advantage in a quantum sce-
nario also implies a nonclassical advantage in any postquan-
tum theory including those formulated within the GPT frame-
work. Second, the resource formalism suitable for explain-
ing the nonclassical advantages should describe a fundamen-
tal theory-independent property, i.e. one that can be certified
merely by relying on the measurement statistics. Contextual-
ity is one such a property that ipso facto forbids a classical
description of the processes. Combining these two, in our
opinion, the study of contextuality of GPTs and the contex-
tual power of single operational elements is a good candidate
for a new approach towards a resource theoretic resolution to
the fundamental problem of sufficient resources for quantum
computations.
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Note added.— During the preparation of this paper, we
became aware of two independent works by Schmid et al [56]
and Barnum and Lami [57]. In the former, the concept of
simplex-embeddable GPTs, which is equivalent to our notion
of ontologically noncontextual subGPTs, is introduced. Ac-
cordingly, a result similar to Theorem 3 is presented. Here, we
further developed the idea by identifying the relationship be-
tween the dimensionalities of subGPTs and ontological mod-
els. The latter work discusses a result overlapping with Theo-
rem 2.
Appendix A: A brief review of measures
The way we lean about the notion of “size” in school is a
very basic one with value assignments that are real or com-
plex numbers. For example, we learn to calculate the area (or
the two-dimensional volume) of a rectangle by multiplying its
sides. We are thought later on that the volume under some
continuous function can be evaluated by Riemannian integra-
tion. This very sensible approach is methodological rather
than conceptual.
In order to abstractize and henceforth generalize the notion
of “size”, we need to pursue the usual mathematical procedure
of creating a mathematical structure. This route consists of
defining some proper sets of objects, some minimal axioms
on those sets that shape the structure, and potentially some
suitable functions on those sets. Once this is done to capture
“size”, we get to a mathematical structure known as measure
theory. In the following, we briefly review this procedure for
interested physicists.
Suppose a set Ω is given. It turns out that “sizes” cannot
be defined for one such arbitrary set. Therefore, instead of
defining “sizes” for elements of Ω, we will define them for
elements of another set generated by Ω, called the σ-algebra
over Ω.
Definition 1. Let Ω be a nonempty set. A σ-algebra for Ω is
a subset ω of the power set 2Ω (i.e. the set of all subsets of Ω)
that satisfies the following axioms:
(i) ω contains Ω;
(ii) If X ∈ ω then Ω\X ∈ ω;
(iii) For any countable sequence {Xi ∈ omega}i∈N it holds
that ∪iXi ∈ ω.
6Definition 2. The pair (Ω, ω) of an underlying set together
with a σ-algebra on it is called a measurable space.
Now, one might be able to develop a sense of why the ax-
ioms of the σ-algebra make it possible to meaningfully assign
“sizes” to its elements. The main idea is that we do have, in a
sense, the notions of complementarity (axiom (ii)) and union
(axiom (iii)) of elements. The first one allows us to under-
stand the relative “sizes” of different elements, including the
relative “size” to the whole collection of elements (axiom (i)).
The second one allows us to grasp the meaning of the “size”
of a joint collection of elements. We can now precisely state
what we mean by “size”.
Definition 3. Given a measurable space (Ω, ω), a measure µ
is a function µ : ω → [0,∞] such that
(i) µ(∅) = 0;
(ii) For any sequence of pairwise disjoint elements {Xi ∈
ω}i∈N it holds that
µ(∪iXi) =
∑
i
µ(Xi). (A1)
Here, by pairwise disjoint elements we mean Xi ∩ Xj = ∅
whenever i 6= j. Again, a measure has a simple interpretation.
For convenience, we need the empty set to have a “size” of
zero. This way, we map the identity element of union of sets
to the additive identity element of R. This is done by axiom
(i). Next, we complete the similarity between set union and
addition overR by condition (ii), which is called the additivity
property.
It must be now clear that µ together with its underlying
space deliver all the properties we expect from “size” assign-
ments to objects in a meaningfully general sense.
Definition 4. The triplet (Ω, ω, µ) is called a measure (or
measured) space.
Definition 5. The elements X of the σ-algebra ω are called
measurable subsets of Ω.
A very useful measure which is also used within the main
text is Dirac’s delta measure. Given the measurable space
(Ω, ω), Dirac delta measure is defined as
δX(x) =
{
0 x /∈ X
1 x ∈ X, (A2)
where X ∈ ω is a measurable subset of Ω and x ∈ Ω. Dirac
delta measure has the “familiar” property that given a measure
f on (Ω, ω) we have∫
Ω
f(x)δX(x)dx = f(X). (A3)
Consider now the case where Ω is the set of all outcomes
of some measurement on some physical system. We can then
define events that are subsets of all possible outcomes. For in-
stance, in flipping a coin the outcomes are ‘heads’ or ‘tails’
and the events are {∅,‘heads’,‘tails’,‘heads ∨ tails’}. The
event ∅ is impossible whereas the event ‘heads ∨ tails’ is cer-
tain. It is straightforward to see that the event set can be iden-
tified with the power set of the set of measurement outcomes,
hence it can be regarded as a σ-algebra. As a result, each event
is a measurable subset of the set of all outcomes. This is, in
fact, the case for all measurements on all physical systems,
motivating us to define the following measure.
Definition 6. Given a measurable space (Ω, ω), a probability
measure p is a measure whose range is the closed interval
[0, 1] and satisfies p(Ω) = 1.
Clearly, p carries the interpretation of a probability distribu-
tion over the space of events assigning a “size” to each event
that is equivalent to our belief of occurrence of that event.
As mentioned in the main text, indeed, there is no particular
reason to restrict the range of measure functions to that of
real intervals. Once we replace the range interval [0, 1] of a
probability measure with a subset of a vector space we obtain
probability measure that its values are vectors rather than real
numbers, that is a probability vector-valued measure (PVVM)
as defined in the main text. Note that the latter holds provided
we can identify a fixed identity element (U ) within the vector
space.
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 1
Following the approach of Refs. [45, 46], from the additiv-
ity property (iii) and that given any E ∈ E , the effect pE for
any real number p ∈ [0, 1] also belongs to E , it follows that
the map q is homogeneous over nonnegative rational numbers,
i.e., q(mE/n) = mq(E)/n for any E ∈ E and m,n ∈ Z+.
Next, suppose that E ∈ E and α, β ∈ [0, 1] with α < β.
Thus, αE and βE belong to E and αE < βE. It is also clear
that E′ := βE −αE = (β −α)E belongs to E . Since βE =
E′+αE implies q(βE) = q(E′) + q(αE) and q(E′) > 0 by
requirement (i), we have q(αE) 6 q(βE). That is, the map q
preserves the order of elements within E .
Now consider a pair of increasing and decreasing sequences
of rational numbers in the [0, 1] interval, (αi)i and (βi)i, re-
spectively, where both converge to the same irrational value
γ ∈ [0, 1]. From order preserving property of q and its homo-
geneity over rational numbers we obtain αiq(E) = q(αiE) 6
q(γE) 6 q(βiE) = βiq(E). Then by the pinching theorem
we have q(γE) = γq(E), that is, the map q must be linear.
Since q is a convex-linear functional that is defined on a
spanning convex subset (E ) of a vector space (V ), it can be
uniquely extended to a linear functional on the whole vector
space (V ). Finally, by Riesz’s theorem, this linear functional
can be written as the inner product q(A) = 〈A,B〉 for a unique
vector B ∈ V .
The normalization of B follows simply from requirement
(ii) as q(U) = 〈U,B〉 = 1. 
7FIG. 2. A heuristic representation of the cones containing three pos-
sible GPTs sharing a subGPT. As described in the proof of Proposi-
tion 1, (a) T = (Esub,S ) where Ssub ⊆ S ; (b) T ′ = (E ,Ssub)
where Esub ⊆ E ; (c) T ′′ = (E ′′,S ′′) where Esub ⊆ E ′′ ⊆ E
and Ssub ⊆ S ′′ ⊆ S . While the subGPT does not satisfy the
no-restriction hypothesis, the extended GPTs do satisfy it, i.e. their
effect and state spaces are dual to each other. Note that the effect or
the state space of all three GPTs can be restricted in such a way to
reproduce the given subGPT.
Appendix C: GPTs as containers for subGPTs
Proposition 1. Any GPT Tsub defined on a vector space V
and identified by the pair Tsub:=(Esub,Ssub) of its physi-
cally allowed PVVMs and states that does not satisfy the no-
restriction hypothesis is a subtheory of possibly (infinitely)
many extended GPTs that do satisfy it.
Proof. It follows from violation of the no-restriction hy-
pothesis thatSsub ⊂ S , whereS is defined as
S := {% ∈ V |〈%,E(X)〉 > 0 ∀E(X) ∈ Esub,〈U,%〉 = 1}.
Hence, Tsub is a subtheory ofT := (Esub,S ), whereT sat-
isfies the no-restriction hypothesis; see Fig. 2a. Alternatively,
one can fix the state space and define the set of effects as
E := {E ∈ V |〈%,E〉 ∈ [0, 1] ∀% ∈ Ssub}.
Clearly this time Esub ⊂ E and thus Tsub is a subtheory of
T ′ := (E ,Ssub), where T ′ satisfies the no-restriction hy-
pothesis; see Fig. 2b.
Finally, any GPTT ′′ := (E ′′,S ′′) such that Esub ⊂ E ′′ ⊆
E ,Ssub ⊂ S ′′ ⊆ S , and E ′′ andS ′′ are dual sets, contains
Tsub as its subtheory; see Fig. 2c. 
Appendix D: Generators of GPT state and effect spaces
Lemma 1. The pair (F ,D) mapping a GPT that satisfies the
no-restriction hypothesis to an NCOM must be the generat-
ing sets of the pair of closed convex sets (E ,S ). That is,
E=convF andS=convD .
Proof. In order to have an NCOM, it is first required that
ζE(X|λ) = 〈E(X),D(λ)〉 > 0 for all E ∈ E and all λ ∈ Υ.
Therefore, in view of the no-restriction hypothesis as in the
definition of the GPT’s state space in Eq. (4) of the main text
and that 〈U,D(λ)〉 = 1 for all λ ∈ Υ, we find thatD(λ) ∈ S ,
which implies convD ⊆ S . Second, by imposing the second
requirement of a noncontextual ontological model on Eq. (10),
that is, η%(λ) > 0 for all % ∈ S and all λ ∈ Υ, we see that
S ⊆ convD(λ). Combining together, it must hold true that
convD = S and thus, the set D is a generating set of the
GPT’s state spaceS .
Similarly, starting from the requirement η%(λ) =
〈%,F (λ)〉 > 0 for all % ∈ S and all λ ∈ Υ for an NCOM
and noting that the set of effects is dual to the set of states
with
∫
Υ
dF (λ) = U , we infer that F (λ) ∈ E and thus,
convF ⊆ E . Next, using the fact that ζE(X|λ) > 0 for
all E ∈ E and all λ ∈ Υ in Eq. (10) of the main text, that is,
%=
∫
Υ
dη%(λ) D(λ), and E(X)=
∫
Υ
dF (λ) ζE(X|λ), (D1)
we find that E ⊆ convF . Together, we have E = convF ,
meaning that the setF is a generating set of the GPT’s set of
allowed effects E . 
Appendix E: Proof of Theorem 2
To give the proof of the theorem, we first need to state and
prove the following geometrically intuitive lemma.
Lemma 2. Given a nonconvexly overcomplete basis A =
{Ai} of vectors for an ordered vector space V , given that
elements of A belong to the positive pointed generating cone
C , there exists an element C ∈ convA such that its convex
decomposition into elements of A is not unique.
Proof of Lemma 2. First, the overcompleteness of A
means that there exists a vector AJ ∈ A that is linearly de-
pendent on the elements in A \ AJ . Nonconvexly overcom-
pleteness thus means that AJ possesses a nonconvex decom-
position AJ =
∑
i 6=J αiAi in terms of other elements of A
such that at least one of the expansion coefficients αi is nega-
tive.
Our proof of the Lemma is constructive. We first show that
there exists a vector B ∈ convA such that B /∈ convA \AJ
and
B =
∑
i 6=J
βiAi,
∑
i 6=J
βi = 1. (E1)
Considering the vector AJ , if
∑
i 6=J αi > 0 then we can sim-
ply set B = AJ/
∑
i 6=J αi. Otherwise, bearing in mind that
due to being an element of a positive cone all αi’s cannot si-
multaneously be negative, we consider a coefficient 0 < α? ∈
{αi}i 6=J that corresponds to the operator A? ∈ {Ai}i 6=J . De-
fine the operatorB(p) := pAJ+(1−p)A? = p
∑
i 6=J αiAi+
(1 − p)A?. Then, for the expansion coefficients of B(p) it
holds true that
∑
i6=J βi(p) = p
∑
i 6=J αi+ (1−p). By defin-
ing α := |∑i 6=J αi| we find
p := p =
{
any p ∈ (0, 1), if α = 0,
1
1+α otherwise,
(E2)
for which
∑
i 6=J βi(p) = 1. Evidently, B(p) ∈ convA
by construction. However, because there exists at least one
8βi(p) = pαi < 0, it also holds true thatB(p) /∈ convA \AJ .
We thus can set B = B(p).
Given the operator B with the properties as in Eq. (E1), we
consider two sets of indices: I − := {i 6= J |βi < 0} and
I + := {i 6= J |βi > 0} and define the operator
C :=
1
N
(B +
∑
i∈I−
|βi|Ai) = 1
N
∑
i∈I+
βiAi, (E3)
in which N =
∑
i∈I+ βi. We see that, both sides of Eq. (E3)
are convex decompositions of C into elements of A , while
only the first decomposition contains the operator AJ (im-
plicit in B). 
Proof of Theorem 2. If the points of Enr form a noncon-
vexly overcomplete basis for V , then by Lemma 2 above, there
exists a vector (an effect) C within E which is not a coarse-
grained effect and yet it possesses a non-unique decomposi-
tion in terms of Enr⊂F . This means the effect C possesses a
non-unique representation in the ontological model that is not
due to coarse-graining. As a result, such a GPT does not ad-
mit an NCOM. A similar argument holds if the extreme points
ofS form a nonconvexly overcomplete basis. 
Appendix F: Proof of Theorem 3
If: All subGPTs Tsub of a hypothetical ontologically non-
contextual GPT T =(E ,S ) are ontologically noncontextual
provided that dimVsub= dimV . To see this, we note that for
any subGPT Tsub=(Esub,Ssub) it holds true that Esub ⊆ E
andSsub ⊆ S , where E andS are the effect and state spaces
of the hypothetical ontologically noncontextual GPTT . Then
for all elements E(X) ∈ Esub and % ∈ Ssub one can sim-
ply use the same ontic assignments ζE(X|λ) and η%(λ) that
one would assign to the states and effects of the hypotheti-
cal GPT T = (E ,S ). These assignments trivially repro-
duce the statistics of the subGPT. There is, however, a subtle
point: the physically allowed measurements are only those
defined by the subGPT as Esub. Now, if dimVsub<dimV ,
then for every state of the subGPT there will exist another
hypothetical state of the GPT within V ⊥sub ⊂ V that, if possi-
ble, would produce exactly the same statistics under those al-
lowed measurements of the subGPT. Correspondingly, there
will be multiple ontic states that generate exactly the same
statistics under the physically possible measurements, hence,
P1∼=P2;µP1=µP2 . In other words, the ontological model
will not be satisfying the broad noncontextuality assumption
(please see Sec. G 2 below for an explicit example).
The only if direction can be shown as follows. Assume that
the subtheory Tsub = (Esub,Ssub) admits an NCOM. This
means that there exist bijective convex linear maps ηsub and
ζsub from state and effect spaces of the subtheory to the ontic
state and indicator functions over some ontic variable space
Υ. We note that we can always assume that the effect and
state spaces of the subGPT span its underlying vector space
Vsub. As a result, ηsub and ζsub can be uniquely extended to
bijective maps η and ζ over the whole Vsub. We also know
that, due to being probability measures on Υ, the ontic state
FIG. 3. A three-dimensional representation of the (ontic) state and
effect spaces of the GPT underlying Spekkens’ toy theory. This is
a simplex whose vertices correspond to vectors spanning R4. The
(epistemic) state and effect spaces of the subGPT (i.e. Spekkens’
toy theory) is obtained by imposing the knowledge balance princi-
ple, which are given by octahedra inside the GPT’s state and effect
spaces. Clearly, while the state and effect spaces of the GPT are
dual to each other and satisfy the no-restriction hypothesis, the state
and effect spaces of the subGPT are not duals and do not satisfy this
hypothesis. Nevertheless, Spekkens’ toy theory is ontologically non-
contextual according to Theorem 3, because it is a subtheory of an
ontologically noncontextual GPT.
and indicator function spaces of the NCOM can be enlarged
to ontic state and measurement spaces whose extreme points
are Dirac delta measures. Indeed, the extended ontic spaces
are dual to each other and satisfy the no-restriction hypothe-
sis. In the next step, we simply apply η−1 and ζ−1, the in-
verses of the extended maps η and ζ, to the extended ontic
spaces to obtain extended state and effect spaces S ⊇ Ssub
and E ⊇ Esub in V . It is immediate that dimV = dimVsub,
and E andS are dual thus the GPT satisfies the no-restriction
hypothesis. Moreover, T = (E ,S ) is ontologically noncon-
textual by construction. Finally, Tsub is a subtheory of T .
We emphasize that the GPT T constructed in this way is only
a hypothetical theory in the sense that the physically allowed
states and measurements are only those described by the sub-
GPT Tsub. 
Appendix G: Two Examples
1. Spekkens’ toy theory
As an interesting example of the application of Theorems 2
and 3, we analyse the noncontextuality of the Spekkens’ toy
theory [53].
In this model, there exists an elementary system whose pure
ontic states are denoted by “1”, “2”, “3”, and “4” that can be
9represented by column vectors
η1 =
100
0
 , η2 =
010
0
 , η3 =
001
0
 , η4 =
000
1
 , (G1)
respectively, i.e. a simplex in R4; see also Fig. 3. The mea-
surements on the system can be considered as questions about
the state of the system. Of particular interest are the two out-
come measurements that are reproducible, or repeatable [52],
in the sense that if repeated upon a system in a pure state they
always output the same outcome. The set of all such mea-
surements define the sharp effects of the dichotomic measure-
ments, and they are given by “is the state of the system 1 or
not?”, “is the state of the system 2 or not?”, “is the state of the
system 3 or not?”, and “is the state of the system 4 or not?”.
Naturally, these measurements are coarse-grained versions of
a single four-outcome nonrefinable measurement that can also
be mapped to a simplex in R4. This PVVM is given by
ζ1 =
100
0

T
, ζ2 =
010
0

T
, ζ3 =
001
0

T
, ζ4 =
000
1

T
,
(G2)
with the unit element ζU = (1, 1, 1, 1). Note that the set of all
PVVMs which is dual to the state space forms a hypercube.
As such, according to Theorem 2, we have a 4-dimensional
classical GPT for the elementary system that satisfies the no-
restriction hypothesis.
Given the elementary system and the GPT for it, one can
define a canonical measurement set to be a minimal set of pos-
sibly coarse-grained measurements that fully determine the
state of the system. For the elementary system above, one
such a set, for example, is given by {“is the state of the sys-
tem 1 OR 2, or not?”, “is the state of the system 1 OR 3, or
not?”}. At this point, it is possible to define the amount of
knowledge to be the maximum number of questions for which
the answer is known, varied over all possible canonical mea-
surement sets.
Given a measure of knowledge, an epistemic restriction can
be imposed on the theory, which results in Spekkens’ toy the-
ory.
The knowledge balance principle [53]: If one
has the maximal knowledge, then for every sys-
tem, at every time, the amount of knowledge one
possesses about the ontic state of the system at
that time must equal the amount of knowledge
one lacks.
After enforcing the knowledge balance principle on the
original theory, a subtheory will be obtained the pure states of
which are given as “1∨ 2”, “1∨ 3”, “1∨ 4”, “2∨ 3”, “2∨ 4”,
and “3 ∨ 4” [53]. Here, ∨ denotes the disjunction or “OR”
operator. These states can be represented by column vectors
η5 =

1
2
1
2
0
0
 , η6 =

0
0
1
2
1
2
 , η7 =

1
2
0
1
2
0
 , η8 =

0
1
2
0
1
2
 ,
η9 =

0
1
2
1
2
0
 , η10 =

1
2
0
0
1
2
 ,
(G3)
respectively, which form an octahedron that is circumscribed
by the GPT’s state space1; see Fig. 3. The set of reproducible
and nonrefinable PVVMs also reduces to {1 ∨ 2, 3 ∨ 4}, {1 ∨
3, 2 ∨ 4}, and {1 ∨ 4, 2 ∨ 3}, that can be represented by
ζ5 =
110
0

T
, ζ6 =
001
1

T
, ζ7 =
101
0

T
, ζ8 =
010
1

T
,
ζ9 =
011
0

T
, ζ10 =
100
1

T
,
(G4)
respectively, which also form an octahedron inside the
GPT’s effect space; see Fig. 3. By the restriction en-
acted, the effect and state spaces of the subGPT do not sat-
isfy the no-restriction hypothesis anymore. It is clear that
dimVSpekkens = 4 equals the dimensionality of the container
GPT. A second way to check this is by considering the proba-
bility table of the subGPT, given as
TSpekkens =
E(5) E(6) E(7) E(8) E(9) E(10)
P5 1 0 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
P6 0 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
P7 1/2 1/2 1 0 1/2 1/2
P8 1/2 1/2 0 1 1/2 1/2
P9 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1 0
P10 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 0 1
, (G5)
and checking its rank. In this case, rankTSpekkens = 4. Given
a probability table for sets of pure preparations and nonrefin-
able measurements, it is known that any model for that ta-
ble must satisfy dimVmodel > rankT [14], where for the
Spekkens’ toy model the equality can be satisfied. Conse-
quently, by Theorem 3, Spekkens’ subGPT is a proper onto-
logically noncontextual subtheory.
2. Stabilizer rebit Theory
Our second example is closely related to but significantly
different from the previous one. The subtheory of stabilizer
1 It is worth emphasizing that, despite the representation given here,
Spekkens’ toy theory does not allow for all possible convex combinations
of its pure states [53]. However, this fact is irrelevant to our analysis.
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rebit is a model in which the nonrefinable effects and pure
states of a qubit system is restricted to E(1),P1 7→ |0〉〈0|,
E(2),P2 7→ |1〉〈1|, E(3),P3 7→ |+〉〈+|, E(4),P4 7→ |−〉〈−|.
These produce a table of probabilities for all in principle pos-
sible prepare and measure experiments on a rebit given by,
Trebit =
E(1) E(2) E(3) E(4)
P1 1 0 1/2 1/2
P2 0 1 1/2 1/2
P3 1/2 1/2 1 0
P4 1/2 1/2 0 1
. (G6)
It is evident that Trebit is a subtable of TSpekkens in Eq. (G5).
Suppose that we want to construct a GPT for this table. The
first question is what the dimensionality of the employed vec-
tor space should be. To answer this question, we note that
rankTrebit = 3 and thus, regardless of the model constructed
being a GPT or an ontological model, dimVmodel ≥ 3.
A GPT on a three dimensional space reproducing T1 can be
given by the states
s1 =
 120
1
2
 , s2 =
− 120
1
2
 , s3 =
01
2
1
2
 , s4 =
 0− 12
1
2
 ,
(G7)
and the effects
e1 =
10
1
T , e2 =
−10
1
T , e3 =
01
1
T , e4 =
 0−1
1
T ,
(G8)
with the unit element eU = (0, 0, 2).
We note that the given GPT does not satisfy the no-
restriction hypothesis, i.e. it is a subGPT. One GPT containing
this subGPT, for instance, is given by the state space generated
by the vectors
s5 =
 121
2
1
2
 , s6 =
− 121
2
1
2
 , s7 =
 12− 12
1
2
 , s8 =
− 12− 12
1
2
 .
(G9)
These states form the extreme points of the dual cone to the
effect space defined by e1, e2, e3, and e4 with a positive inner
product with all the given effects and thus, if the no-restriction
hypothesis holds, they must be legitimate states. It is clear that
the states s1,s2,s3, and s4 can be written as convex combina-
tions of s5,s6,s7, and s8. For instance, s1 = (s5 + s7)/2.
From Theorem 2 follows that this GPT is ontologically con-
textual.
Given the four pure states and the four nonrefinable effects
of table Trebit in Eq. (G6), no ontological model that respects
the broad noncontextulity and reproduces the desired prob-
abilities exists for card Υ= dimVontic=3. Hence, the sub-
GPT is ontologically contextual for card Υ= dimVontic=3.
We now show that increasing dimensionality does not resolve
this issue.
Quite easily, it is possible to construct an ontological model
for the above subGPT by enlarging the ontic space such that
card Υ= dimVontic=4. We can represent preparations and
measurement effects as ontic states and indicator functions
η5 =
100
0
 , η6 =
010
0
 , η7 =
001
0
 , η8 =
000
1
 (G10)
and
ζ5 =
100
0

T
, ζ6 =
010
0

T
, ζ7 =
001
0

T
, ζ8 =
000
1

T
,
(G11)
respectively. This is exactly the GPT containing Spekkens’
toy theory. There are various ways in which we can construct
a subGPT reproducing Trebit, one of which is via the states
and indicator functions
η1 =

1
2
1
2
0
0
 , η2 =

0
0
1
2
1
2
 , η3 =

1
2
0
1
2
0
 , η4 =

0
1
2
0
1
2
 (G12)
and
ζ1 =
110
0

T
, ζ2 =
001
1

T
, ζ3 =
101
0

T
, ζ4 =
010
1

T
.
(G13)
The most important point here is that, despite being an on-
tological model, this model does not satisfy broad noncontex-
tuality when noting that we are operationally restricted to the
statistics given by the subGPT. In other words, assuming the
subGPTTrebit (or in general, any GPT) implicitly implies that
no preparation and measurement beyond what is predicted by
the subGPT exist. As a result, we can readily verify that the
vector
η? =

1
2
0
0
1
2
 , (G14)
produces the same statistics as the maximally mixed rebit state
ηmm =

1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
 , (G15)
for every physically legitimate ontic effect generated by
{ζ5, ζ6, ζ7, ζ8} of Eq. (G13).
Note that, η? does not belong to the state space of the sta-
bilizer rebit subGPT Srebit but it is an ontic state of the full
ontological model, i.e. it is a convex combination of states in
Eq. (G10). As such, given the preparation procedure Pmm that
generates the table
Tmm =
E(1) E(2) E(3) E(4)
Pmm 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
, (G16)
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we have two possible ontic assignments:
Pmm 7→ ηmm or Pmm 7→ η?. (G17)
Therefore, eventhough ηmm and η? are distinct ontic func-
tions with regards to the full ontic measurements of Eq. (G11),
by the implicit assumption of the stabilizer rebit subGPT, it
is operationally impossible to distinguish them. As a result,
Eq. (G17) is in clear contradiction with broad noncotextual-
ity assumption for NCOMs and the fact that each preparation
equivalence class must be represented by a unique ontic state
that is completely determined by the observable statistics.
It is worth pointing out that similar arguments can also be
made by exchanging the roles of ontic states and indicator
functions.
Appendix H: Is there a conflict?
An interesting lesson we learn from the example of sta-
bilizer rebit subtheory is that restricting classical theories
(in this case the ontologically noncontextual GPT given by
Eqs. (G10) and (G11)) in certain ways may also give rise to
ontologically contextual subtheories. This will face us with
the dilemma of choosing between (i) assuming all subtheories
of classical theories are classical and thus ontological contex-
tuality is not a purely nonclassical effect, or (ii) ontological
noncontextuality is a purely nonclassical effect and thus sub-
theories of classical theories can also be nonclassical. Our
personal preference is the latter, because the assumption of (i)
cannot be justified. In particular, there is no reason to call a
weird-looking world wherein our empirical observations are
restricted in such a way that certain statistics have multiple
undeterminable ontic explanations classical, noting that any
such explanation is different from our current classical per-
ception of the world.
One might also be concerned that the claim “stabilizer rebit
subGPT is ontologically contextual” conflicts with other re-
sults, e.g. Refs. [7] and [16], or that this subGPT can be clas-
sically simulated. We, however, emphasize that there is no
conflicts with either of these results for the following reasons.
In Refs. [7, 16], the idea is to build an NCOM for a given
table of probabilities rather than a subGPT. There is a signifi-
cant difference between the two, namely that, once a subGPT
(like the stabilizer rebit theory) is given it is assumed that
no observable statistics exist beyond those pre-
dicted by the (sub)theory.
Therefore, if an NCOM exists in larger spaces, the extra statis-
tics predicted by the NCOM is empirically unobservable lead-
ing to the previously discussed contradiction. In sharp con-
trast, given merely a set of experimental data there is no as-
sumption that the given data is all one can in principle mea-
sure for the physical system. Hence, once an NCOM for the
data is built (possibly in larger dimensions) it is implicit that
the extra statistics predicted by the model but not included in
the given table are indeed empirically observable. Hence, the
difference between the two scenarios is in assuming or not as-
suming empirical observability of the statistics predicted by
the NCOM beyond the given table or the subGPT, respec-
tively.
A similar argument holds when we speak of classical sim-
ulatibility, wherein, again, there is no assumption of physical
possibility or impossibility of certain statistics. Therefore, as
an example, the stabilizer rebit subGPT being ontologically
contextual does not imply it being classically nonsimulatable.
This highlights the conceptual difference between “classical-
ity” and “classical simulatibility”. Our position of classicality
identified by ontological noncontextuality requires, in addi-
tion to classical simulatibility, that the (sub)GPT is not un-
derdetermined in the sense that there are no in principle in-
accessible variables present at the ontological level. The lat-
ter requirement follows the spirit of Leibniz’s methodological
principle, as Spekkens [54] puts it,
“If an ontological theory implies the existence of
two scenarios that are empirically indistinguish-
able in principle but ontologically distinct (where
both the indistinguishability and distinctness are
evaluated by the lights of the theory in question),
then the ontological theory should be rejected and
replaced with one relative to which the two sce-
narios are ontologically identical.”
The principle thus asks for ontologically identical descriptions
of facts that cannot be empirically distinguished. It is clear
that, in the example of rebit stabilizer subGPT, replacing ηmm
with η? results in two ontologically distinct accounts for the
same subGPT (i.e. empirical) description. Hence, the rebit
stabilizer subGPT does not allow for an ontological model
satisfying the Leibniz’s methodological principle and, by our
definition, it is a nonclassical subGPT.
Appendix I: Proof of Theorem 4
That (i) if and only if (ii) follows from the definition of
nonclassical resources given above. That (i) if and only if (iii)
follows from Theorem 2 and that Enr (pure states) forms a
complete basis for V . That (iii) if and only if (iv) follows
from the assumption that Enr (pure states) form a complete
basis for V , hence adding an extra nonrefinable extreme point
overcompletes it if V ?=V . Conversely, it is trivial that if an
overcompleting element lies within E , it is either refinable or
a convex combination of the extreme points. 
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